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FACTORS IN THE DETERMINATION
OF THE VALUATION OF
PRIVATE BUSINESS INTERESTS
By RICHARD D. RENNIE,* JACK G. VIcQ** and GEORGE J. MURPHY**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses certain aspects of a study conducted by the authors
of the judicial process as it relates to the determination of valuation of pri-
vate business interests.' The study had two principal parts:
1. To examine the various business valuation variables within the cases which
appear to discriminate the decisions in order to further describe the judicial
process and the court's reaction to the area of business valuation; and,
2. To describe the numerical distribution of the court decisions and, to investigate
whether various factors such as size of valuation, level of tribunal, member
of Tax Review Board or Justice of the Federal Court hearing the case, type
of case under examination and time period have any effect upon the determi-
nation of the judicial value.
This paper concerns mainly the first part of the study-an examination
of some of the variables which appear to discriminate business valuation
cases. Six variables were chosen: general valuation principles, valuation of
goodwill, minority interests, restrictive agreements, expert evidence and the
burden of proof. The results of the second part of the study are contained in
the Appendix.
This study examined all cases relating to the valuation of private busi-
ness interests for federal tax purposes which have been reported in the
Canada Tax Cases for the period 1917-1979 inclusive. In order to further
isolate cases relating to the valuation of private business interests, the indexes
for Dominion Tax Cases2 were also examined and additional relevant cases
included. In this search, 121 cases were identified, involving the valuation
of 125 business interests. Where a case was appealed, it was included at each
level as a separate observation unless valuation was not an issue.
II. GENERAL VALUATION PRINCIPLES
There have been no published guidelines to assist judicial tax tribunals
in Canada in the determination of the fair market value of private business
@ Copyright, 1982, Richard D. Rennie, Jack G. Vicq and George J. Murphy.
* Assistant Professor of Accounting, University of Regina. Formerly of the tax
department of Thorne Riddell & Co., Calgary; Senior Adviser in Tax Policy, Alberta
Treasury; Clarkson Gordon, Regina.
** Professor of Accounting, University of Saskatchewan.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of their colleague, Professor K.
Smith, Professor of Marketing and Management, University of Saskatchewan.
1 A "private business interest" is one that is defined to be "(a) the net assets of either
an unincorporated or an incorporated privately owned business, or (b) the shares of a
private corporation."
2 Canada Tax Cases and Tax Appeal Board Cases, Consolidated Index, 1917-1975
and [1976-79] Canada Tax Cases.
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interests. Therefore the courts have relied on principles developed in the field
of accounting and specific valuation publications. Where a particular issue
in a case was not dealt with in the literature or in previous decisions, the
courts were often forced to make an arbitrary judgment which then formed
the basis for future decisions. For example, regarding the amount of discount
to be allowed for shares which are to be placed in escrow, if required, Mr.
Justice Thurlow stated in 1976: "As I find nothing in the evidence to guide
me in assessing what such a discount should be, it must, it seems to me, be
fixed more or less arbitrarily. On that basis, I think it should not be less than
5% and I shall fix it accordingly. ' 3
The use of financial statements in the valuation of business interests has
long been recognized by the courts.4 In 1954, Fordham indicated the main
factors that he thought should be considered in the valuation of shares of
businesses: book value or adjusted book value, past earnings, estimated
maintainable profits with reference to past results, earnings value and divi-
dends value and whether a majority or minority holding is involved.e
The valuation of par value shares issued for consideration other than
cash has been an issue in many cases. The question arises whether par value
shares received as consideration for property transferred or services rendered
should be assigned a fair market value equal to their par value or the value
of the consideration received. The argument that the shares are worth their
par value relates to the approval by the directors of the transaction and their
assignment of a value to the related asset or service received in terms of the
number of par value shares issued." The value of assets received being equal
to the par value of shares issued has been reported in a number of cases,7
but subsequent court and board decisions have attempted to limit the appli-
cation of this principle. For example, Fordham stated: "There is no magic
in incorporation. Shares thus created do not thereby acquire an unvarying
value that should always be attributed to them."8 Subsequent cases, involving
redeemable preferred shares and otherwise, were left with the principle that
shares were worth their par value only by coincidence where no other objec-
tive evidence as to their value existed. 9
With regard to specific areas of business valuation, the courts have had
3 Corlite Petroleums v. The Queen, [1976] C.T.C. 766 at 773, 76 D.T.C. 6450 at
6455 per Thurlow J. (F.C.T.D.).
4 Robson v. M.N.R., [1951] C.T.C. 201 at 205, 51 D.T.C. 500 at 502 per Sidney
Smith D.J. (Ex.), af'd [1952] S.C.R. 560.
5 No. 179 v. M.N.R. (1954), 11 Tax A.B.C. 76 at 78 (Fordham).
6 Kanaseivich v. M.N.R. (1961), 26 Tax A.B.C. 20 at 23-24 (Boisvert).
7 E.g., Tuxedo Holding Co. v. M.N.R. (1957), 17 Tax A.B.C. 166, af'd [1959]
C.T.C. 172, 59 D.T.C. 1102 (Ex.).
8 Moyniham v. M.N.R. (1962), 28 Tax A.B.C. 293 at 296 (Fordham). Other cases
where the fair market value was found not to be equal to the par value include: Walker
v. M.N.R. (1962), 29 Tax A.B.C. 174; Segal v. M.N.R. (1961), 26 Tax A.B.C. 93;
Wise v. M.N.R. (1961), 26 Tax A.B.C. 6; Piercy v. M.N.R. (1956), 15 Tax A.B.C. 56;
Levitt v. M.N.R., [1976] C.T.C. 2307 (T.R.B.).
9 Inland Resources Co. v. M.N.R., [1965] Ex. C.R. 313, [1964] C.T.C. 393, 64
D.T.C. 5257; No. 267 v. M.N.R. (1955), 13 Tax A.B.C. 135.
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to decide on the appropriateness of an earnings multiple (discount rate), the
period of earnings to be included to project future results and so on. Such deci-
sions are necessarily arbitrary, and can only be made by comparison with the
litigants' contended value. For example, with regard to the earnings multiple to
be used in a particular set of circumstances, Fordham stated in 1958 that:
seven or eight times earnings... is too high where a private company is con-
cerned and would be more appropriate if we were considering some public corpo-
ration, the stock of which is readily marketable. In the present instance, I think
that five times the earnings may be regarded as the proper proportion .... 3.0
Although many judicial decisions may be arbitrary, either due to lack
of evidence in a particular case or the subjective nature of business valua-
tions themselves, a number of guidelines within which judicial decisions may
be made have been established. Regarding capitalization rates or earnings
multiples, Flanigan J. stated that:
I think it is generally accepted that the factors affecting the choice of a proper
multiple earnings ratio are numerous. They depend on certain well-established
principles and these include, as I have said, whether or not the business is a
high-risk business, what the interest rates might be at material times, what the
future economic outlook is for the general area, the question of competition and
the matter of repayment of the purchase price .... 11
In order to arrive at a notional valuation at a prior point in time, the
use of hindsight is not normally permitted, that is, subsequent actual earnings
cannot be used as an indication of the value of the business at the prior
date. 2 Where appropriate, projected earnings may be used. 13 The general
principle is, consequently, that hindsight is not admissible to determine a
value at a time in the past; however, it is not considered to be hindsight to
use subsequent events to evaluate the reasonableness of projections made of
future income. As well, future events may be used to assess facts which
would have been available at the time for which the valuation is sought.1
4
For instance, it has been held that succeeding events may be used to assess
whether or not the goodwill had any value at the date of the valuation:
Learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that there was no guarantee that
Crandall would stay, or that business would stay if Crandall left, but the fact is
that Crandall did stay, and as we look back now we see that the business has
prospered. The question is: Am I entitled to take advantage of hindsight in
arriving at my decision? I think I am. 15
III. VALUATION OF GOODWILL
Cases involving the valuation of goodwill are basically of two types:
those where a business is transferred not at arm's length such as upon in-
10 No. 513 v. M.N.R. (1958), 19 Tax A.B.C. 242 at 248.
11 Seto Holdings Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 2347 at 2349 (T.R.B.).
12Brunelle v. M.N.R., [1977] C.T.C. 2506 at 2511 (Cardin) (T.R.B.).
13 In Connor v. The Queen, [1978] C.T.C. 669 at 678 (F.C.T.D.), Mahoney J.
stated that "[t]he reasonableness of projected earnings may be measured against the
yardstick of actual results without arriving at those projections by application of hind-
sight."
14 Simard & Cie. v. M.N.R., [1964] C.T.C. 461 (Ex.).
15 Crandall v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 2289 at 2293 per Flanigan I. (T.R.B.).
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corporation and those involving the allocation of the total purchase price
among the component assets of the business. In both types of cases there has
been an attempt to define the nature of goodwill, the conditions under which
it may have commercial value and the methods by which its value may be
established.
Consolidated Laundry & Cleaning Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.,10 involving
the allocation of the sales price of a business between depreciable assets and
goodwill, indicated that goodwill could be valued either directly or on a
residual basis as the total consideration less the value of the tangible assets.
There first had to be, however, an indication that goodwill was in fact an
asset that had been transferred before any value would be attributed to it.
References to accounting authorities provided definitions of goodwill
more susceptible to determination: "only in the presence of an anticipated
income in excess of a normal rate of tangible resources to be employed can
a value be found in excess of the fair appraised value of the existing tangible
assets.' u7 Following this residual approach to the valuation of goodwill, the
question arises as to how the tangible assets are to be valued. In 1959,
Fordham held that tangible assets should be valued at their worth to the
purchaser, not the vendor.' The result of this method is that goodwill, as
calculated on a residual approach, will also be the value to the purchaser
and not the vendor. Given the same business and different purchasers then,
the allocation of the total purchase price among the component assets may
be different.
A number of cases have involved the use of rule-of-thumb methods to
determine the value of goodwill or the total value of the business. Such
attempts to use these methods have met with little success primarily because
of the rule that the existence of goodwill must have been established before
it can be arbitrarily valued. This has been the major point of divergence
between the judicial notion of goodwill and that of a number of accounting
practitioners. 9 Rule-of-thumb methods have been accepted but only in situa-
tions where they represent the method which was actually used by the parties
to the transaction. 20
The courts have held that commercially saleable goodwill must be shown
to exist before it can be assigned or sold in non-arm's length transfers, such
as the incorporation of a proprietorship or a partnership. This is particularly
difficult where the businesses of professionals are concerned, as it is hard to
separate the earnings that attach to the personal goodwill of the professionals
16 (1958), 21 Tax A.B.C. 168.
17 Pafon, Accountant's Handbook (3d ed. New York: Ronald Press, 1948) as re-
ferred to in No. 295 v. M.N.R. (1955), 14 Tax A.B.C. 81 at 84.
'
8 No. 636 v. M.N.R. (1959), 22 Tax A.B.C. 171. A subsequent case at the Ex-
chequer Court level follows the same argument. See Herb Payne Transport v. M.N.R.,
[1963] C.T.C. 160.
19 Rabow v. M.N.R. (1961), 26 Tax A.B.C. 445 at 446.
20 Dominion Dairies Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1966] Ex. C.R. 397, [1966] C.T.C. 1, 66
D.T.C. 5028; see also Butler v. M.N.R., [1967] 1 Ex. C.R. 425, [1967] C.T.C. 7, 67
D.T.C. 5019.
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(and cannot be sold or transferred) from earnings that relate to goodwill
'based on location, product or service, or general business goodwill. In 1974,
Flanigan J. stated the criteria for acceptance of the transfer of professional
goodwill:
- reputation for reliable work in a variety of problem areas;
- ability to attract and maintain a large group of clients;
- a staff of professionals capable of handling divergent problem areas;
- nature of the work-whether recurrent or nonrecurrent;
- nature of the clientele and their likelihood to introduce further business;
- trend of profits.21
In non-arm's length situations, the residual approach of valuation cannot be
easily used since the total value is not known. A capitalized-earnings ap-
proach has been adopted: "[a] well-recognized method of evaluating good-
will is to ascertain the net earnings of the business, allow a conservative rate
of return on the capital cost of its acquisition and attribute any surplus to
goodwill."'
Judges or members have recognized that the valuation of a business,
and consequently the determination of goodwill, is subjective. Some mem-
bers have expressed doubt as to their ability to determine the precise value of
goodwill.23
IV. MINORITY INTERESTS
A minority interest in a company is that which does not represent de
jure voting control. Current literature indicates that discounts ranging from
zero to fifty percent24 from "en bloc" values are often suggested to take into
account the additional lack of liquidity associated with minority sharehold-
ings. The courts appear to have approached the valuation of a minority in-
terest in this manner, that is, to apply a discount rate to rateable value, in a
number of cases. Fordham stated in 1967: "In view of the fact that only
one of the shareholders was not related to the deceased, but was a corporation,
I think that 10%, instead of the more usual 20%, would be an appropriate
allowance to make to the minority interest held."2 5 In an earlier decision,
Fordham had stated that "[t]here is no generally-accepted yard stick or rule
of thumb for gauging the value of minority shareholdings in relation to
majority shareholdings."26
In No. 513 v. M.N.R.,2 7 Fordham compared a dividend yield at six
percent to the valuation of a minority interest on an earnings basis in order
to assess the reasonableness of the valuation decision made. A recent case
provides further evidence that, in some instances, the courts favour a direct
21 Supra note 15, at 2291-92.
22 Plouffe v. M.N.R., [1965] 1 Ex. C.R. 781, [1964] C.T.C. 580 at 596, 64 D.T.C.
5351 at 5359.
23 Neuls v. M.N.R., [1975] C.T.C. 2215 at 2219 (Flanigan J.) (T.R.B.); Peters v.
M.N.R. (1959), 22 Tax A.B.C. 402 at 406 (Snyder).
2 4 Campbell, Canada Valuation Service (Toronto: De Boo, 1977) Sec. 7 at 71.
25 Taylor Estate v. M.N.R., [1967] Tax A.B.C. 555 at 560.
26 Supra note 5, at 79.
2 7 Supra note 10.
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valuation of a minority shareholding over an arbitrary discount applied to
the rateable value.28
V. RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS
The issue with respect to restrictive agreements is whether or not such
agreements affect the fair market value of a business or share by restricting
the market in which they may be transferred; whether all they affect is the
price at which the shares or business will in fact be sold subject to some
previously imposed condition or whether a hypothetical purchaser is not
subject to previously imposed obligations.2 9
In Barber Estate v. M.N.R.,30 the question hinged on whether shares
having voting control should be entitled to a greater proportion of the value
of the company upon liquidation than that provided by the letters patent of
the company. It was held that such voting control would have allowed the
holder to appropriate all assets to his benefit even though this was not
allowed by the company's letters patent: "[T]he [deceased] was at liberty
to change, alter, or amend, at will, what he had caused to be created in the
first instance. The mere fact that the restrictive provisions governing Margot's
shares had been recorded in letters patent in Ottawa did not render such
provisions immutable."''a This decision should be compared to the decision in
Fiddes Estate v. M.N.R., 32 which seems to indicate an increasing awareness
of the rights of minority shareholders. In Beament Estate v. M.N.R.,33 the
question of restrictive agreements regarding the transfer of shares arose again.
President Jackett of the Exchequer Court explained the problem:
If therefore, as of the time of his death or later, the shares were for sale on
terms that they would continue, in some way, to be subject to the obligations
assumed by the deceased under the contract, no person using reasonable judgment
would have paid more for them than [the redemption amount] ... The other view
of the matter... is... that the "fair market value" of the shares as of the date
of the death of the deceased is what a hypothetical willing purchaser would pay to a
hypothetical willing vendor for the shares on the basis that the purchaser would
not be in any way subject to the obligations that the deceased had assumed by
the contract. 4
It was held by the Exchequer Court that the fair market value of the shares
2 8 Carruthers v. M.N.R., [1979] C.T.C. 3150 (T.R.B.).
29 In IT-140R2, Revenue Canada indicated that for the purposes of determining
the fair market value of property immediately before death in a non-arm's length situa-
tion, the provisions of a buy-sell agreement are to be disregarded. This bulletin would
appear to be in conflict with the principles developed in the Beament case although
they can, perhaps, be reconciled by the fact that the provisions of the Income Tax Act
provide for a deemed disposition immediately prior to death, while the Estate Tax Act
(under which the Beament case was decided) dealt with the fair market value of prop-
erty at death. See Beament Estate v. M.N.R., [1969] 1 Ex. C.R. 407, [1968] C.T.C. 559,
69 D.T.C. 5016, rev'd [1970] S.C.R. 680, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 237, [1970] C.T.C. 193, 70
D.T.C. 6130.
30 (1966), 41 Tax A.B.C. 27.
31 Id. at 32.
32 [1970] Tax A.B.C. 156.
3 3 Supra note 29.
34 Beament Estate v. M.N.R., [1969] 1 Ex. C.R. 407 at 413, [1968] C.T.C. 558 at
563-64, 69 D.T.C. 5016 at 5020.
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should be valued without reference to the contract, although it was stated
that if the provisions requiring winding-up had been in the constitution of
the company then they would have determined the value. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, this decision was reversed:
Once it appears that on the death of the deceased the company had to be wound
up, it seems to me that the fair market value of the 2,000 shares must be the
same whether that winding-up takes place under the compulsion of an enforceable
contract or pursuant to a mandatory provision in the letters patent.35
This case established the authority that restrictive agreements should be con-
sidered in the determination of the fair market value of the related shares.
This principle was confirmed in a 1975 case.36
VI. EXPERT EVIDENCE
In business valuation cases, both the taxpayer and the Minister of Na-
tional Revenue assert a value which they contend to be the fair market value
of the shareholding or business in question. Each party has been assisted,
in the majority of cases, by testimony given by an expert witness. In the cases
surveyed in this study, it was found that taxpayers most often called char-
tered accountants as their expert valuators. The minister most often called
a valuator in his employ. Recent cases indicate, however, that departmental
valuators and chartered accountants may not be accepted as experts unless
certain conditions apply.
In Schaefer Brothers Inc. v. M.N.R., 37 Tremblay indicated that to
be an expert witness in business valuation matters, it is necessary, in most
circumstances, that the witness be a member of the Canadian Association of
Business Valuators.3 8 In Lauder v. M.N.R.,3 9 a principle developed in a real
estate valuation case, Friedman v. M.N.R., 40 was applied regarding the
independence of the expert:
Notwithstanding the witness's knowledge in the field of evaluation, I believe that
[the departmental valuator] though undoubtedly acting in good faith, has disquali-
fied himself as an expert witness by admitting to having attempted to negotiate
35 Beament Estate v. M.N.R., [1970] S.C.R. 680 at 688, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 237 at
242-43, [1970] C.T.C. 193 at 199, 70 D.T.C. 6130 at 6134.
3 6 Smith Estate v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 317, 74 D.T.C. 6291 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd
[1975] C.T.C. 335 (F.C.A.).
37 [1979] C.T.C. 2379 (T.R.B.).
38 There is no reason in 1978 that one can testify as appraisal expert [sic] without
being member of an association of appraisers. The policy of the Board during the
former years by [sic] accepting as expert a person who was not a member of an asso-
ciation of appraisers, was only a temporary policy. It is the Board's opinion that to give
an expert opinion there is a presumption: only the members of an appropriate profes-
sion are qualified to testify in court.
Because of the evolution of the appraisal science in Canada during the last seven
years and the incorporation of appropriate associations, an appraisal report must be
given in court by a member of an association of appraisers. It would be exceptional
and on a [sic] strong evidence of very great experience that this rule be infringed. [id.
at 2387 (Tremblay), translated from his decision in Les Meubles de Maskinonge v.
M.N.R., [1979] C.T.C. 2028 at 2042 (T.R.B.).]
39 [1979] C.T.C. 2911 (T.R.B..).
40 [1978] C.T.C. 2809 at 2813, 78 D.T.C. 1599 at 1601 (T.R.B.).
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a fair market value of the subject property with the appellants, an activity which,
in my opinion, is not consistent with my concept of the role of an expert witness. 41
Consequently, the expert employed by either litigant should not have been
involved in negotiations prior to preparing his valuation report if his testi-
mony is to be accepted as that of an expert.
VII. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN VALUATION CASES
The burden of proof in income tax cases is not stated in the Income
Tax Act.4 The Supreme Court of Canada decided in 1948, by a majority
of the Justices, that the onus is on the taxpayer to disprove the assessment:
.[T]he proceeding is an appeal from the taxation; and since the taxation is on
the basis of certain facts and certain provisions of the law either those facts or
the application of the law is challenged. Every such fact found or assumed by the
assessor or the Minister must then be... dealt with by these persons unless
questioned by the appellant .... Since the taxpayer in this case must establish
something, it seems to me that that something is the existence of facts or law
showing an error in relation to the taxation imposed on him. 43
The fair market value of a property at a given point in time is presumed to
be a question of fact. As such, the taxpayer must, according to this decision,
demonstrate that the facts upon which the Minister of National Revenue has
relied are in error. This principle is evident in two subsequent decisions.44
There is a presumption in our tax system, then, that the valuation made
by Revenue Canada is correct until proven otherwise. Two recent cases,
however, have shed doubt on the validity of this rule:
Success is divided. Both parties took, and maintained throughout, extreme posi-
tions which were entirely dissociated from reality. While the defendant ought to
have recognized that the HPL shares had some significant fair market value on
December 31, 1971, the plaintiff, an experienced businessman, ought to have
recognized that the value did not remotely approach that claimed by him. There
were, of course, experts for hire willing to support those extreme positions .... 40
I do believe the appellant has valued his shares on a very optimistic basis and has
reached a value in excess of their Valuation Day value. The valuator for the
respondent has been too conservative and pessimistic .... 46
Both cases, accusing the litigants of asserting extreme values, were heard in
1978. The findings may explain the statement by Tremblay in 1979 indicating
that a compromise decision may be justified by the Board:
"As the two valuators are honest and intelligent, the Board would not make an
error by totaling up the figures retained by the two valuators ... and by dividing
by two the... totals... .47 This proposition is illustrative of the arbitrary
nature of business valuations, as recognized in a number of court decisions:
41 Supra note 39, at 2913.
42 R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as am. by S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
43 Johnston v. M.N.R., [1948] C.T.C. 195 at 202, 203 (S.C.C.).
44 MacDonald Estate v. M.N.R. (1959), 1 Tax A.B.C. 250 at 250; Losey v. M.N.R.,
[1957] C.T.C. 146 at 153-54, 57 D.T.C. 1098 at 1102 (Ex.).
45 Connor v. The Queen, [1978] C.T.C. 669 at 680, 78 D.T.C. 6497 at 6505
(F.C.T.D.).
46Kaufman v. M.N.R., 1978] C.T.C. 2201 at 2208 (Dubrule) (T.R.B.).
4 7 Stanfield v. M.N.R., [1979] C.T.C. 2093 at 2096 (T.R.B.).
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One point regarding goodwill on which everyone agrees is that there is no exact
rule to be used in determining its value.48
I cannot say, since the rate of capitalization to be used is a judgement call, that
either expert is clearly wrong. 49
The personal goodwill indeed is not commercial and transferable. The problem
is to state a percentage. The Board thinks it is equitable to value personal good-
will of the appellant at least at 40% .50
VIII. SUMMARY
Over time, the courts have developed a number of principles regarding
the interpretation of the law but have been unable to refine some of the
arbitrary aspects of business valuation. Since the courts have been given little
guidance from legislators, they have relied on accounting authorities and the
opinions of expert witnesses. In this regard, they have stated that only quali-
fied appraisers will be accepted as experts. Where two experts' opinions
differ, one member of the Tax Review Board felt justified in making a com-
promise decision. A compromise decision clearly leads to injustice in our
taxation system as there is no opportunity for the better argument to win.
The courts have held that the burden of proof in valuation decisions that
involve questions of fact is on the taxpayer. It seems to have been difficult
for the taxpayer to discharge the onus of disproving the valuation of Revenue
Canada. The study suggests that a possible reason for this difficulty is that
valuations are in part arbitrary; consequently, the taxpayer is unable to dis-
prove Revenue Canada's valuation to the extent it is based on an arbitrary
assumption in the valuation model.
APPENDIX
The tribunal-determined valuations are examined and presented by means
of a frequency distribution. The range of the frequency distribution is the
taxpayer's contended value and Revenue Canada's contended value. The
tribunal decisions have been standardized over a range from 0.000 to 1.000
with the lower boundary representing the taxpayer's value and the upper
boundary indicating Revenue Canada's value. This standardization removes
size as a variable. Throughout this appendix, the transformation of the
tribunal-determined value will be referred to as the "standardized judicial
value". For each observation the standardized judicial value is calculated as
follows:
Standardized Judicial Value = JV - TP
RC-TP
where:
JV = the tribunal-determined value
TP = the taxpayer's contended value
RC = Revenue Canada's contended value
4 8 Ducharme v. M.N.R., [1978] C.T.C. 2562 at 2582 (Tremblay) (T.R.B.).
4 9 Mersereau v. M.N.R., [1977] C.T.C. 2412 at 2420 (Dubrule) (T.R.B.).
5o Cameron v. M.N.R., [1978] C.T.C. 3148 at 3153 (Tremblay) (T.R.B.).
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The standardized judicial value represents the ratio of the difference between
the tribunal's value and the taxpayer's value to the total range of the dis-
pute. For example, assume:
Taxpayer's contended value = $1,000
Revenue Canada's contended value = $2,000
Tribunal-determined value = $1,500
Substituting these amounts in the above formula yields:





This is midpoint on the frequency distribution and represents a compromise
decision. If the decisions are clustered around a value of 1.000 it indicates
that the taxpayers' values are not being accepted by the courts and may
imply that taxpayers are unable to discharge the burden of proof placed upon
them by the courts. If the decisions are clustered around a value of 0.000
it will indicate that the tribunals are confirming the taxpayers' valuations.
TABLE 1
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED JUDICIAL VALUE
OVER RANGE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAXPAYER'S CON-
TENDED VALUE AND REVENUE CANADA'S CONTENDED VALUE
Standardized
Judicial Value Number Percentage
0.00- 0.05a 33 26.4 ")
0.06-0.15 3 2.4
0.16 -0.25 1 0.8 33.6
0.26-0.35 2 1.6
0.36 -0.45 3 2.4
0.46 - 0.55b 4 3.2
0.56 - 0.65 3 2.4 ")
0.66 -0.75 7 5.6
0.76-0.85 8 6.4 63.2
0.86 -0.95 5 4.0
0.96- 1.00 c  56 44.8
Totals 125 100.0
a In all 33 valuations the tribunal's value equalled the taxpayer's value.
b In 3 valuations the tribunal's value equalled the compromise value of 0.5.
c In 55 valuations the tribunal's value equalled Revenue Canada's contended value.
This table indicates that in the majority of the cases observed, the tri-
bunal-determined value was closer to Revenue Canada's contended value than
the taxpayer's contended value.
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TABLE 2
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED
JUDICIAL VALUE BY SIZE OF INCOME INCLUSION*
Standardized Judicial Value
0.00- 0.11- 0.26- 0.76- 0.91-
Income 0.10 0.25 0.75 0.90 1.00 Row Totals
Inclusion % % % % % %
less than $15,000 34.8 - 21.8 - 43.4 100.0 (23)
$15,000- $30,000 29.2 - 8.3 8.3 54.2 100.0 (24)
$31,000-$50,000 47.8 4.3 8.7 4.3 34.9 100.0 (23)
$51,000 - $75,000 10.5 - 26.3 15.8 47.4 100.0 (19)
$76,000-$200,000 31.6 - 10.5 10.5 47.4 100.0 (19)
greater than $200,000 12.5 - 18.8 12.5 56.2 100.0 (16)
Total Survey 29.0 0.8 15.3 8.1 46.8 100.0 (124)a
*Income inclusion has been defined as the change in taxable income (including
future years), change in gift amount (gift tax), or increase in assessed value of estate
(estate tax and succession duties).
a One decision had insufficient data to determine the amount of income inclusion.
This table indicates that the chance of a taxpayer's success is small where
the income inclusion is greater than $200,000. This may result from a tax-
payer's willingness to dispute a large assessment (perhaps without the bene-
fit of strong evidence supporting his valuation) because the litigation costs
are small compared to the potential benefits.
TABLE 3
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED
JUDICIAL VALUE BY LEVEL OF TRIBUNAL
Standardized Judicial Value
0.00- 0.11- 0.26- 0.76- 0.91-
Level of 0.10 0.25 0.75 0.90 1.00 Row Totals
Tribunal* % % % % % %
S.C.C. and F.C.A. 33.3 - - 33.4 33.3 100.0 (6)
Ex. and F.C.T.D. 32.2 - 10.7 7.1 50.0 100.0 (28)
T.R.B. and I.T.A.B. 27.5 1.1 17.5 8.8 45.1 100.0 (91)
Total Survey 28.8 0.8 15.2 9.6 45.6 100.0 (125)
*The following abbreviations have been used:
S.C.C. = Supreme Court of Canada
F.C.A. = Federal Court of Appeal
Ex. = Exchequer Court of Canada
F.C.T.D. = Federal Court, Trial Division
T.R.B. = Tax Review Board
I.T.A.B. = Income Tax Appeal Board
It appears that a greater proportion of the results favour Revenue Can-
ada's position in the higher courts (that is, in the standardized judicial value
range from 0.76 - 1.00).
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TABLE 4
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED
JUDICIAL VALUE BY JUSTICE OR MEMBER
Standardized Judicial Value
0.00- 0.11- 0.26- 0.76- 0.91-
Justice or 0.10 0.25 0.75 0.90 1.00 Row Totals
Member % % % % % V
With 5 or more valuations:
A 33.3 4.8 33.3 4.8 23.8 100.0 (21)
B 30.0 - - 20.0 50.0 100.0 (10)
C 44.4 - - - 55.6 100.0 (9)
D 11.1 - 11.1 44.5 33.3 100.0 (9)
E 37.5 - 12.5 - 50.0 100.0 (8)
F - - 20.0 20.0 60.0 100.0 (5)
G 40.0 - - - 60.0 100.0 (5)
H 40.0 - - - 60.0 100.0 (5)
Group Totals 30.6 1.4 13.9 11.1 43.0 100.0 (72)
All Others 26.4 - 17.0 7.5 49.1 100.0 (53)
Total Survey 28.8 0.8 15.2 9.6 45.6 100.0 (125)
It is difficult to generalize from these results due to the limited number
of cases heard by each judge or member. It would appear, however, that
some judges or members often choose a value between the range of the two
contended values while others tend to choose one contended value or the other.
TABLE 5
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED
JUDICIAL VALUE OVER TIME
Standardized Judicial Value
0.00- 0.11- 0.26- 0.76- 0.91-
Time 0.10 0.25 0.75 0.90 1.00 Row Totals
Interval % % % % % %
1949 - 1954 16.7 - 16.7 - 66.6 100.0 (6)
1955-1959 17.6 5.9 17.6 11.8 47.1 100.0 (17)
1960- 1964 40.9 - 13.7 4.5 40.9 100.0 (22)
1965 - 1969 25.0 - 20.0 - 55.0 100.0 (20)
1970- 1974 40.7 - 11.7 7.5 40.7 100.0 (27)
1975-1979 21.2 - 15.2 21.2 42.4 100.0 (33)
Total Survey 28.8 0.8 15.2 9.6 45.6 100.0 (125)
It is again difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the change in valu-
ation decisions over time. There is a possible trend towards discounts from
Revenue Canada's contended value. Perhaps this is due to the existence of
the "family control" concept that existed under the Estate Tax Act, S.C. 1958,
c. 29, as am. by S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 43. That is, minority discounts were not
allowed when valuing companies or shares for estate tax purposes if the com-
pany was controlled by persons related to the deceased. Since these provisions
have not been carried over to the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as
am. by S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, some of the decisions relating to the Income
Tax Act may reflect minority discounts from Revenue Canada's valuation.
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TABLE 6
RELATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED






























0.00- 0.11- 0.26- 0.76- 0.91-
0.10 0.25 0.75 0.90 1.00 Row Totals% % % % % %
[2.9
[0.0
- - 57.1 100.0 (7)
- 13.3 - 46.7 100.0 (15)
1.2 6.2 25.0 18.8 18.8 100.0 (16)
0.0 - - 20.0 100.0 (5)
- - - 25.0 75.0 100.0 (4)





- 21.1 - 36.8 100.0 (19)
- 14.3 10.7 57.1 100.0 (28)
- - - 60.0 100.0 (5)
- 50.0
28.8 0.8 15.2
- - 100.0 (2)
9.6 45.6 100.0 (125)
As indicated in Table 6, the type of case seems to have a major role in
whether or not the tribunal's value approximates either Revenue Canada's or
the taxpayer's contended values. It should be noted that the greatest number
of decisions where appeals were allowed in part occurred in the areas of the
valuation of minority share interests, general valuation of shares and general
valuation of businesses. A large portion of cases dealing with the value of
shares received for services or property (either upon receipt or sale) were
decided in favour of the taxpayer.
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